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IN BE CAFFEY

[68C.2d

[Crim. No. 11761. In Bank. June 25, 1968.]

In re ALGEA CAFFEY on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Habeas Oorpul!-Grounds for Relief-Trial-Violation of Defendant's Oonstitutional Rights: Right to Oounsel.-In challenging two prior convictions charged in connection with a
California marijuana offense, defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing by the sentencing court on the first otherwise
valid prior conviction, sufficient of itself to justify the imposition of additional punishment in the California case, on his
allegations and offer of proof of non-representation by counsel,
and if found not to have been properly represented by counsel
thereat, was entitled to a similar hearing on the subsequeqt
charged prior convietion, and if found to have been properly
represented thereat, to a determination of the validity of such
conviction on constitutional grounds, where relief was sought
by habeas corpus in superior court of the county in which
petitioner was confined, which properly transferred the matter
to the sentencing court for hearing.
[2] Poisons-Offenses and Prosecutions-Oonstitutionality of Statutes.-Although Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 [19
L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 697], Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S.
62 [19 L.Ed.2d 906, 88 S.Ct. 709], and Haynes v. United
States, 390 U.S. 85 [19 L.Ed.2d 923, 88 S.Ct. 722], involving
the impact of the Fifth Amendment on federal gambling and
firearms legislation, cast substantial doubt on the validity of
convictions for violation of the Marijuana Tax Act (26 U.S.C.,
§ 4741 et seq), they afford no reason to doubt the validity
of convictions for smuggling marijuana (18 U.S.C., § 545),
although based on failure to declare and invoice marijuana
upon importation, as the purpose of the declaration requirement is not the harassment of a particular class of persons
or the obtaining of evidence in order to prosecute them; thus
a habeas corpus petitioner's 1943 marijuana smuggling conviction under former 19 U.S.C., § 1593b (now 18 U.S.C., § 545),
did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination.
[1] See Oal.Jnr.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 90 et seq; Am.Jur., Habeas
Corpus (1st ed § 147 et seq).
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, § 29; Am.Jur.2d, Drugs,
Narcotics, and Poisons, § 35 et seq.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, §§ 30(4), 30(5);
[2] Poisons, §9.1; [3] Habeas Corpus, §65(4); [4] Criminal Law,
§l08; [5] Habeas Corpus, §§ 60(3), 61(1); [6] Habeas Corpus,
§ 30(4).
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[3) Habeas Corpus-Judgment-Remand.-On a habeas corpus
proceeding challenging the validity of two charged and admitted prior convictions at which petitioner asserted he was not
represented by counsel, petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing by the sentencing court, and the matter must be
remanded to the sentencing court for such hearing and resolution by it of petitioner's allegations that he was denied the
right to counsel on a prior otherwise valid conviction, where
the record in the habeas corpus proceeding disclosed a conflict
in evidence relating thereto.
[4] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Consultation.-The denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to
confer, to consult with the accused, and to prepare his defense,
could convert the appointment of counsel into a sham and
nothing more than a formal compliance with the Constitution's
requirement that an accused be given assistance of counsel.
[6] Habeas Corpus-Hearing-Burden of Proof-Denial of Right
to Counsel: Presumptions.-While federal records import a
presumption that official duty was regularly performed, the
presumption is not conclusive and will not be invoked to preclude a showing that the record is incomplete or inaccurate;
thus a habeas corpus petitioner attacking the validity of a
charged and admitted prior conviction in federal court for
asserted nonrepresentation by counsel, who made a specific
offer of reliable proof was entitled to be given the opportunity
to present testimonial and documentary evidence to sustain
his burden of disproving facts recited in the record, where
the record entry that petitioner appeared with counsel at the
prior conviction did not state when or how counsel was appointed, nor whether petitioner pleaded guilty with the assist~ce of an attorney who was his counsel in fact as well as
pro forma.
[6] Id.-Grounds for Relief-Violation of Defendant's Constitutional Rights.-Althongh defendant must ordinarily raise a
constitutional issue by a pretrial motion to strike a prior conviction from an information or indictment, or by entering a
plea denying the prior conviction, a habeas corpus petitioner's
failure to pursue such remedies did not constitute a waiver of
his right to a hearing as to his nonrepresentation by counsel
at his prior conviction, despite a court record to the contrary,
where at the time of his California conviction in which the
prior conviction was charged, it had not judicially been made
clear that defendant could offer extrinsic evidence to disprm'c
facts recited in official records of conviction or to prove that

[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 157; Am.Jur.2d, Cl"iminal
Law, §312.
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an incomplete record masked violation of constitutional rights,
and where a finding of waiver would unduly restrict the right
to relief from a substantial increase in punishment based on
a constitutionally invalid conviction.

Proceeding in habeas corpus to challenge the validity of
prior convictions. Writ granted with directions to redetermine sentence.
Algea Caft'ey, in pro. per., and Earl Klein, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, and Richard H. Cooper, Deputy
Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner is confined in the California
Men's Colony ·at Los Padres under a judgment of conviction
of violating Health and Safety Code section 11500 (possession of heroin) entered upon his plea of guilty in the San
Francisco Superior Court on February 18, 1959. He admitted
two prior federal narcotics convictions, and the court. sentenced him to imprisonment for not less than two nor more
than twenty years (former Health & Saf. Code, § 11712).1 In
this habeas' cc:irpus proceeding he challenges the validity of
his prior convictions.
I
Petitioner's first prior conviction was entered on June 30,
1943, in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas upon his plea of guilty to the charges of
unlawful importation of marijuana into the United States
without paying the annual registration tax (former 26 U.S.C.
§ 3234(a), now § 4755(a», unlawful acquisition of marijuana
without paying the transfer tax (former 26 U.S.C. § 2593(a),
now § 4744),2 and unlawful concealment and transportation
of marijuana after importing it without invoice or declaral' 'Any person convicted under this division for having in possession
any narcotic, ••• shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail
for not more than one year, or in the state prison for not more than 10
years. If such perSOn has been previously convicted of any offense under
thr laws .•. of the United States, which if committed in this State
would have been punishable as an offense described in this division, the
previous conviction shall be charged • • • and • • • if admitted by the
defendant, he shall be imprisoned in the state prison for not less than two
nor more than 20 years."
2Thcse statutes are part of what is sometimes referred to as the Marijuana Tax Act.

)
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tion (former 19 U.S.C. § 1593(b), now 18 U.S.C. § 545).
Petitioner's second prior conviction was also for unlawful
acquisition of marijuana wihout paying the transfer tax. It
was entered on April 19, 1950, upon his plea of guilty in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas.
The records of the federal courts state that petitioner
appeared with counsel at the proceedings in 1943 and 1950.
Petitioner alleges and offers to prove, however, that if counsel appeared for him in either proceeding, the appearance
was a mere formality and that he was therefore denied the
right to effective legal representation. Petitioner first applied
for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of San
Luis Obispo County. On June 23, 1967, that court ordered
that petitioner be returned to the San Francisco Superior
Court for an evidentiary hearing on the validity of the prior
convictions. (See In re Woods (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 3, 11 [48
Cal.Rptr. 689, 409 P.2d 913] ; In re Luce (1966) 64 Ca1.2d
11,14 [48 Cal.Rptr. 694,409 P.2d 918]; In re Tucker (1966)
64 Cal.2d 15, 21 [48 Cal.Rptr. 697, 409 P.2d 921].) On
August 24, 1967, the San Francisco Superior Court ordered
that petitioner be returned to San Luis Obispo County "for
further hearing." On September 15, 1967, the superior court
of that county denied the petition on the basis of the records
in the federal courts. Neither court held an evidentiary hearing.a
We issued an order to show cause why petitioner should
not have an opportunity in an evidentiary hearing to prove
that his prior convictions were obtained in violation of his
aWe note at the outset that petitioner properly applied for the writ in
the court of the county in which he was confined, San Luis Obispo. Pur·
suant to our decisions in the Woods, Luce, and Tucker eases that court
properly ordered the venue ehanged to the San Francisco Superior Court,
the sentencing court, when it appeared that facts were alleged that, if
true, would require resentencing. (Cf. Code Civ. Proc., § 397, subd. 1;
28 U.S.C. § 224I(d).) The San Francisco Superior Court declined to
entertain the proceeding, apparently on the erroneous ground that the
San Luis Obispo Superior Court had no power to transfer the proceeding.
The sentencing court, however, must respect a transfer of a habeas corpus
proceeding from the superior court having territorial habeas corpus jurisdiction when that cOllrt grants the petition to permit reconsideration of
the sentence. The sentencing court must conduct an evidentiary hearing
if it determines that such a hearing is necessary and must redetermine
the sentence in accordanc with its findings. Its order will be appealable
as an "order made aiter judgment, affecting the substantial rights '.' of
the defendant or the People. (Pen. Code, §§ 1237, 1238; cf.People v.
Stein (1948) 31 CaI.2d 630, 633 [191 P.2d 409].)

)
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right to counsel. He now contends also that he was convicted
under federal statutes that violate the Fifth Amendment
guarantee of the privilege against self-incrimination. He
invokes principles recently anllounced by the United States
Supreme Court in Marchetti v. United States (1968) 390
U.S. 39 [19 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 697]; Grosso v. United
States (1968) 390 U.S. 62 [19 L.Ed.2d 906, 88 S.Ct. 709,
716J; and Haynes v. Um:ted States (1968) 390 U.S. 85 [19
L.Ed.2d 923, 88 S.Ct. 722], which involved the impact of the
Fifth Amendment on federal gambling and firearms legislation.
\Ve have concluded that petitioner is entitled to a hearing
to determine whether he was denied the right to counsel at
the proceeding in 1943. \Ve have also concluded that the
federal statute (former 19 U.S.C. § 1593(b), now 18 U.S.C.
§ 545) prohibiting concealment and transportation of marijuana imported without invoice or declaration does not violate the Fifth Amendment. If petitioner's right to counsel
was not violated when he was convicted of violating that
statute in 1943, that conviction would be a valid prior conviction sufficient to support his sentence under former Health
and Safety Code section 11712. 4
[1] If the trial court determines that petitioner's right
to counsel was violated at the 1943 proceeding, it must then
conduct a hearing on petitioner's allegations that he was
denied the right to counsel at the 1950 proceeding, when he
was again convicted of unlawful acquisition of marijuana
without paying the transfer tax. If the court determines that
the right was also denied at the 1950 proceeding, it must
disregard both prior convictions in redetermining petitioner's sentence. Only if the court finds that petitioner was not
afforded the right to counsel in the 1943 proceeding, but was
afforded that right in the 1950 proceeding, will it be necessary to reach the questions whether the federal statute
prohibiting the unlawful acquisition of marijuana without
paying the transfer tax violates the Fifth Amendment and
4This offense would qualify as an "offense under the laws • . . of the
United States which if committed in this State would have been punish·
able as all offense described" in division 10 of the Health and Safety
Code (see former § 11712, now § 11500). The transportation and eon·
c('almcnt of marijuana ill California is punishable under section 11531.
See also People v. Machado (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 63, 67 [4 Cal.Rptr.
110]. Moreover, under former section 11712 one prior conviction was
sufficient to support a senten~e of imprisonment for not less than two nor
more than twenty years. (See fn. I, supra.)
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whether petitioner may properly assert the privilege against
self·incrimniation on habeas corpus following a plea of guilty
at triaJ.li Further consideration of the questions relating to
the validity of the Marijuana Tax Act will therefore be
deferred until after the determination of the right to counsel
issue. Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court may llave
settled the issue as to the validity of that statute in the light
of the Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes cases. 6
[2] Although tb.se decisions cast substantial doubt on
the validity of convictions for violations of the Marijuana
Tax Act (see dissenting opinion of Chief Justice 'Warren,
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 77, at p. 83 [19 L.Ed.2d at
p. 917] ), they afford no reason to doubt the validity of eonvieIiDefendants in Marchetti v. United States and Haynes v. United States
asserted the privilege at trial. Defendant in Grosso v. United States
asserted the privilege at trial as to some but not all of the charges against
him, but the Supreme Court found no effective waiver of the privilege on
the ground that its assertion would have been futile under the preexisting
law. (Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. at pp. 70·71 [19 L.Ed.2d at
pp. 913·914]; see also Harris v. Vnited States (8th Cir. 1968) 390
F.2d 616.) 'fhere is no indication, however, whether the Marchetti,
Grosso, and Haynes cases will be applied to release prisoners whose judg·
ments of cOll'l"iction had become final at the time of these decisions. Ordi·
narily, of course, defendants convicted under a statute that is subsc·
quently declarcd unconstitutional are entitled to release, whether their
judgments of convictions are final or not. (See Ex parte Siebold (1879)
100 U.S. 371, 376·377 [25 L.Ed. 717, 719].) When the constitutional
infirmity depends on its "proper assertion" (see Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. at p. 42 [19 L.Ed.2d at p. 894]), the result is not 80
clear.
6In thesc cases the Supreme Court reversed convictions for failing to
register and pay the occupational tax for the business of accepting
wagers (26 U.S.C. §§ 4411, 4412; Marchetti v. United States); for failing
to pay the excise tax on the gross amount of all wagers acceptcd (26
U.S.C. § 4401; Grosso v. United States); and for possession of unreg·
istered firearms (26 U.S.C. §§ 5851, 5841; Haynes v. United States).)
To comply with these statutes defendants were required to disclose infor.
mation exposing them to "substantial and' real' •.. bazards of incrim·
ination" in areas" 'permeated with criminal statutes.' " (Marchetti v.
United Statcs, 390 U.S. at pp. 53, 47 [19 L.Ed.2d at pp. 901, 897].) The
court determined that such methods of taxing and regulating unlawful
activities contravened the Fifth Amendment privilege against self·
illc.rimination.
Unitrd States v. Covington (S.D. Ohio 1968) 282 F.Supp. 886, hold·
ing 26 United States Code section 4744(a) (1) unconstitutional, is the
only reported decision we have found applying the Marchetti, Grosso, and
Haynes decisions to the Marijuana Tax Act.
The United States Supreme Court haa granted certiorari in Leary v.
United States (5th Cir. 19(7), to consider the ouestion whether thc rcgis·
tration and tax provisions in 26 United States Code sections 4741 (a),
4742 and 4744 (a) violate petitioner '8 privilege against self·incrimination
in the light of the Marchctti, G1'OSSO, :md Haynes eases. (Junc 10, 1968;
392 IT.S. 903 [:20 L.Ed.2d 1362, 88 S.Ct. 2058].)
,
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tions for smuggling marijuana. It is true that petitioner's
conviction in 1943 for unlawful concealment and transportation of marijuana rests on his failure to declare and invoice
it upon importation. 7 Such declaration, however, in fact prevents the crime of smuggling from occurring. "The purpose
of requiring the goods to be declared is to prevent their
importation or to make sure they are not imported without a
duty being paid." (Mansfield, '1'he Albertson Cases: Conflict
Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the
Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup.Ct.Rev. 103,
141.) Moreover, declaration of possession of marijuana at the
port of entry into the United States does not expose the
declarant to prosecution for untaxed possession within the
United States under 26 United States Code section 4744 or
4755. "Had [petitionerJ invoiced tIle marijuana at his first
opportunity, he would have been relieved of it by the Customs agents, and thus would not have smuggled it, and
would not have been in possession of it within the United
States," (Italics in original. Pickett v. Unite,d States (S.D.
Cal. 1963) 223 F.Supp. 695, 696, cert. den. (1964) 37!) U.S.
939 [13 L.Ed.2d 349, 85 S.Ct. 346J (upholding validity of 21
U.S.C. § 176a, substantially identical with former 19 U.S.C.
§ 1593 and with 18 U.S.C. § 545) ; Rule v. United States (5th
Cir. 1966) 362 F.2d 215, 217 (same).) Thus, the "harassment
of a particular class of persons or the obtaining of evidence
in order to prosecute them" is not the purpose of the
declaration requirement. (Mansfield, op. cit. supra, 1966
Sup.Ct.Rev. at p. 141; see also concurring opinion of Justice
Brennan, Grosso v. United States, supra, 390 U.S. 72 at p. 73
718 United States Code section 545 provides: "Whoever knowingly
and willfully, with intent to defraud the United States, smuggles, or clan·
destinely introduces into the United States any merchandise wllich should
have been invoiced, or makes out or passes, or attempts to pass through
the customhouse any false, forged, or fraudulent invoice, or other document or paper; or whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings
into the United States, any merchandise cont.rary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise after importation, knowing the
same to have been imported or brought into the United States contrary to
law •.. is subject to the prescribed penalties."
.
The indictment charged that on or about May 24, 1943, petitioner
"unlawfully concealed and facilitated the transportation Ilnd concealment,
after importation, of 15 pounds of marijuana, which had been theretofore
imported into the United States of America from the United States of
Mexico without the same being invoiced and without proper entry thereof
being made, and. without declaration thereof being made to any proper
officer of the Umted Statcs, . . . then and there well knowing said merchandise to have been so imported contrary to law at the time • • • [he]
concealed and facilitated the transportation and concealment thereof."

)
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[19 L.Ed.2d at p. 914].) We therefore conclude that petitioner's 1943 conviction under former 19 United States Code
section 1593b did not violate his privilege against selfinc rim ina tion.
[3] Whether that conviction properly supports an
increase in punishment under former Health and Safety
Code section 11712 therefore turns on the determination of
the right to counsel issue. 'l'he minutes of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas, El Paso
Division, state that on June 30, 1943, petitioner and a codefendant appeared "each in proper person and by W. H.
Fryer and Jos. L. Dunigan, their counsel, respectively," and
pleaded guilty to the charges in the indictment filed June 21,
1943. Judge Charles A. Boynton then sentenced petitioner to
four years; imprisonment. The "Memo of Proceedings" for
the date of trial also contains the notation, "W. H. Fryer,
Attorney for Caffey." In his return to the order to show
cause, the Attorney General states that Mr. Fryer is dece~ed
and Mr. Dunigan has no independent recollection of the case.
In his verified petition petitioner alleges that he is a Negro
and that courts in the southern states customarily meted out
"kangaroo court" justice to Negroes. He offers to prove by
sworn eyewitness testimony that he first appeared in court on
June 15, 1943, and pleaded guilty without counsel and without waiving counsel. He alleges that on June 30, 1943, the
following events occurred:
"Honorable Judge C. A. Boynton asked Petitioner if he
had counsel, Petitioner replied he did not have counsel. The
Judge again asked Petitioner if he was Guilty of the
Charges, Petitioner replied that he was guilty. . . . The
Honorable Judge C. A. Boynton then spoke to the Courtroom-Saying, Is there anyone in the Court who will
volunteer to stand up beside this man while being sentenced'
At that time an Attorney stood at Petitioner's side, (Undoubtedly, it was this Attorney, W. H. Fryer that's referred
to in the transcript), and sentence was passed. Petitioner did
not see or talk to any counsel from the time he was arrested,
or see any counsel during his court appearances, and did not
talk to the counsel that stood beside him while he was being
sentenced." (Italics and statement in parentheses are petitioner's.) The truth of these allegations can be determined
only in an evidentiary hearing.
•

C.Zd~

770

Ix

RE CAFFEY

[68.C.2d

If petitioner proves that he was denied the right to counsel
at the 1!)43 proceeding, he is entitled to a hearing on his
allegations that he was denied the right to counsel at the
1950 proceeding as well, and that the 1950 conyietion therefore cannot support his S(,11tl'nee under former Health and
Safety Code section 11712. 'rite judgment of the United
Stntes District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
Laredo Division, statt's that on April 19, 1950, petitioner
"appeared in person and with counsel," and pleaded guilty
to count three of the indictnwnt. On motion of the United
States Attorney, Judge James V. Allred dismissed counts one
and two, lind sentenced petitioner on count three to four
years' imprisonment. The docket entry for that date states
that petitioner and codefendant Thomas appeared with attorneys vV. W. Allen and Jacob Hornberger.
The Attorney G(>neral has attached to his return the affidavit of William 'V. Allen, a Laredo attorney, to which Mr.
Allen had appended a copy of a letter he wrote Mr. Hornberger on April 14, 1%0, to acknowledge receipt of a $100
retainer in the case of "Pnited States vs. Thomas and
Caffey," a eopy of an entry for the retainer in his income
journal for 1%0, and copies of two entries in his 1950 Daily
Schedule ;Book. An April 17 entry states, "United States vs.
'l'homfls and Caffey-Federal Court"; an April 19 entry
states, "United States vs. Thomas and Caffey, 1 :30 p.m.,
Pleas of Guilty." Mr. Allen states in his affidavit that "Mr.
Hornberger was originally employed and represented either
one or both of the defendants at the preliminary examination
and asked me to appear with him in the case at the time of
entry of the pif'a of guilty. . . . I reeall talking to the two
defendants in the detention cell in the Federal Court Building prior to pleading in Court. . . ."
The Attorney General also submits with his return an affidavit of J ucob IIornbprgPl' sta1 ing that he has no indePl'UUC'llt recollection of the case. He appended to his affidavit
II (·opy of a reepipt that Iw :.ra vt' Mrs. Gladys Caffey on April
14, 1950, for $200 "in full payment of fees for representation
of A Jg-C'r CHffec~ [sic], and Brewington C. Thomas in Federal
charge," a telegram dated April 17, 1950, and sent from
Lufkin Texas, stating': "Be late getting there due to bad
weather and siekness, but on our way now. Gladys Caffey,"
and the original of the letter he received from Mr. Allen
aeknowledging reeeipt of the $100 retainer.
Pe1itioner alleges that Judge Allred scheduled the trial for

June 1968]
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April 19, 1950, upon petitioner's request that "he would like
to wait until his wife arrived from California to see if she
had money to retain counsel for him. . . ." Petitioner's
wife arrived, but did not have money enough to retain counsel for petitioner. He offers to prove by sworn eyewitness
testimony that he pleaded to one count of the indictment
after informing the court that he had no counsel and no
money to retain one. "Then the Judge asked Petitioner if
there was anything he wanted to say before sentencing. At
this time Petitioner's wife asked the Honorable Judge if she
could. address the Court, which she was permitted to do. She
asked the Court to show leniency. . . . The Honorable Judge
Allred then sentenced Petitioner to four years. Petitioner did
not have counsel and did not waive counsel. "
In an affidavit Mrs. Gladys Caffey states that at the time of
her husband's arrest in 1950 She was residing in Los Angeles
and that she drove to Laredo to join him at his trial. She
denies sending a telegram to Mr. Hornberger from Lufkin,
Texas, stating that Lufkin is near the eastern border of
Texas and was not on her route from Los Angeles. She denies
paying Mr. Hornberger $200 to represent her husband. "I
was present in court with my husband at the time of sentencing and there was no attorney present representing him or
who stated anything to the court on his behalf. "
It is for the sentencing court to resolve the conflict in the
evidence. That court has not had the benefit of the affidavits
of Mrs. Caffey, Mr. Hornberger, and Mr. Allen. We must
therefore remand the case for the trial court's determination
in the light of these affidavits and any evidence the parties
might offer in the trial court.
If true, petitioner's allegations would render the prior
convictions "devoid of constitutional support." (People v.
Coffey (1967) 67 Ca1.2d 204, 215 [60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430
P.2d 15].) If no counsel was present at petitioner's court
appearances and if petitioner did not waive the assistance of
counsel, the convictions violated the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel that Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458 [82
L.Ed. 1461, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 146 A.L.R. 357], secured to indigents in federal courts. Nor can the token presence of counsE'1
that petitioner concedes as to the 1943 conviction satisfy constitutional requirements. [4J "The denial of opportunity
for appointed counsel to confer, to consult with the accused
and to prepare his defense, could convert the appointment of

)
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counsel into a sham and nothing more than a formal compliance with the Constitution's requirement that an accused be
given the assistance of counsel." (Avery Y. Alabama (1940)
308 U.S. 444, 446 [84 L.Ed. 377, 379, 60 S.Ct. 321]; see
Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 53, 71 [77 L.Ed. 158,
162-163, 171-172, 53 S.Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R. 527] ; In re Newbern
(1960) 53 Cal.2d 786, 790 [3 Cal.Rptr. 364, 350 P.2d 116] ;
Von Moltke v. Gillies (1948) 332 U.S. 708, 722-723 [92 L.Ed.
309, 320-321, 68 S.Ct. 316] ; Jones v. Cunningham (4th Cir.
1962) 297 F.2d 851, 855.)
[5] The Attorney General contends that the federal
records import a presumption that official duty was regularly
performed (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 15), and that
petitioner is therefore not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
on the validity of the prior convictions. The presumption of
regularity, however, is not a conclusive one·, and we do not
invoke it to preclude a showing that the record is incomplete
or inaccurate. 8 A docket entry that defendant was" 'duly
arraigned' " and ", informed . . . of his legal rights,'"
for example, '" does not state how, when or in what manner' " defendant was informed, "nor does it specify which
of his various rights were thus made known to him." (In re
Johnson. (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 325, 330-331 [42 Cal.Rptr. 228, 398
P.2d 420] ; see also In re Smiley (1967) 66 ·Cal.2d 606, 622
[58 Cal.Rptr. 579, 427 P.2d 179].) Similarly, the recor4 __
entry that petitioner appeared with counsel does not state
when or how counsel was appointed, nor whether petitioner
pleaded guilty with the assistance of an attorney who' was his
counsel in fact as well as pro forma. Petitioner has the
burden of disproving the facts recited in the records. When,
as here, he makes a specific offer of reliable proof, he "must
be given the opportunity to present . . . testimonial and
documentary evidence relevant to the disputed issues."
(Townsend v. Sain (1963) 372 U.S. 293, 322 [9 L.Ed.2d 770,
791, 83 S.Ct. 745] ; Wright v. Dickson (9th Cir. 1964) 336
F.2d 878, 883; see In re Bell (1942) 19 Cal.2d 488, 501 [122
SThe Attorney General relies on our statement that "The record imports absolute verity. . . . " (In re Oonnor (1940) 16 Cal.2d 701; 708
[108 P.2d 10].) That statement, however, was preceded by the observa·
tion that "There is nothing . . . in the method shown to have been
employed in prevaring the record, or in any .other matter brought out by
petitioner, which would cast a doubt upon the verity and authenticity of
the [record]." (In re Oonnor, supra, 16 CaI.2d at pp. 707-708.) The court
then proceeded to determine from all the available information that peti·
tioner 'f,j eh~ims were unfounded.
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P.2d 22) ; Haacks v. Wainwright (5th Cir. 1968) 387 F.2d
176,179.)
[6] The Attorney General contends that petitioner's failure to challenge the validity of the prior convictions at an
earlier time precludes his doing so on habeas corpus. "\Ve held
in In re Woods, supra, 64 Cal.2d 3, In re Luce, supra, 64
Cal.2d 11, and In re Tucker, supra, 64 Ca1.2d 15, that habeas
corpus would lie to attack the constitutional validity of
foreign prior convictions. The Attorney General points out
that the petitioners in those cases attacked state convictions
whose unconstitutionality was determined in 1963 in Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 83 S.Ct. 792, 93
A.L.R.2d 733], after the petitioners' California convictions
were entered (see In re Woods, supra, at pp. 7-8), whereas
federal courts were required to appoint counsel for indigents
since 1938 (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. 458), before
petitioner was convicted.
It is true that defendants must ordinarily raise a constitutional issue by a pretrial motion to strike the prior conviction from the information or indictment, or by entering a
plea denying the prior conviction. (People v. Coffey, supra,
67 Ca1.2d 204, 215, 217.) Petitioner's failure to pursue these
remedies, however, could not constitute a wa'iver of the right
to a hearing in this case, for at the time of his California
conviction in 1959, we had not yet made it clear that defendants could offer extrinsic evidence to disprove facts recited in
official records of conviction or to prove that an incomplete
record masks violatIons of constitutional rights. s Moreover,
to find a waiver in these circumstances would unduly restrict
the right to relief from a substantial increase in punishment
based on a constitutionally invalid conviction. 10
9Prior to the Wooas, Luce, and Tucker cases, we limited our examina·
tion of foreign convictions to consider whether the foreign crime fit one
of the categories established by Penal Code section 644 for the purpose
of determining habitual criminality (In re McVic7cel's (1946) 29 Cal.2d
264, 278·279 [176 P.2d 40]) and to determine whether the rendering
court had jurisdiction to try the defendant. (See In re WOlfson (1947)
30 Cal.2d 20, 31 [180 P.2d 326].) That a factual hearing may .be appropriate and permissible to establish constitutional infirmities did not become clear until 1966 when the Wooas, Luce, and Tucker cases were
decided.
lOThe fact that petitioner's prior convictions were entered upon pleas
of guilty of course does not prcclude his contcnding that he did not have
nor waive the assistance of counsel. (Rice v. Olson (1945) 324 U.S. 786,
788-789 [89 L.Ed. 1367, 1369-1370, 65 8.Ct. 989].) The prior convictions
that we permitted petitioners to attack in the Woods, Luce, and Tucker
cases, for example, were entered upon pleas of guilty. (See also In re
Johnaon (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325, 333-334 [42 Cal.Rptr. 228,398 P.2d 420].)

)

The writ is granted and the Superior Court of the County
of San Francisco is directed to redetermine petitioner's sentence in People v. Caffey (S.F. Superior Court No. 55643) in
accordance with thc views expressed herein. The question we
have reserved of the constitutionality of the federal statutes
can thereafter be reviewed,. if necessary, on appeal from the
trial court's order resentencing petitioner.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., eoncurred.
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